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Others as the Ground of our Existence: Levinas, Løgstrup and 
Transcendental Arguments in Ethics  
 
Robert Stern 
 
While transcendental arguments in theoretical philosophy have perhaps gone 
out of favour, transcendental arguments in practical philosophy have retained a 
reasonable following, with their proponents being more optimistic on their 
behalf. It is ǣǡǯ
well-known critique of transcendental arguments in theoretical philosophy 
suggested that in the end they rely on a kind of idealism,1 and while such 
idealism may seem problematic when it comes to the objects of our theoretical 
beliefs (the external world, other minds, and so on), when it comes to practical 
philosophy, such idealism or at least anti-realism may seem more palatable, so   ǯ   seem to have less force. It could then be 
assumed that in practical philosophy, transcendental arguments have useful 
work to do, which is why they have been deployed by a diverse range of writers, 
from Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard, to communication theorists such as 
Karl-Otto Apel and his followers, to Catholic thinkers such as John Finnis. 
Proponents of such arguments typically take the foe to be the moral sceptic, who 
asks why he should be bound by morality and its norms, and try to show on 
transcendental grounds, to do with the necessary conditions for communication, 
or self-hood or agency or whatever, that the sceptic is always already bound by 
these norms, so in some ǯcannot be properly posed, 
and thus is answered.  
 My aim in this paper is straightforward. I want to first discuss an 
argument of this sort that has recently been attributed to Emmanuel Levinas by 
Diane Perpich, as a way of unǯǤ
this as a representative of the use of a certain sort of transcendental argument 
against the sceptic, I will argue that it is not a convincing way to deal with their 
doubts, as it fails to achieve what it sets out to do. However, turning from Levinas 
to the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup, I will argue that one can 
                                                        
1 ǤǡǮǯǡJournal of Philosophy, 65 (1968), 
pp. 241-56. 
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find transcendental reflections in his thought too, but used in a different way: not 
to answer the moral sceptic via a transcendental argument, but to help us show 
how certain fundamental misconceptions underlie moral scepticism nonetheless. 
I will suggest in this role transcendental reflections can be more successful Ȃ and 
that perhaps this is the way we should understand Levinasǯ  Ǥ
Thus, while I think we should give up the ambition of trying to answer the moral 
sceptic directly using transcendental arguments, this does not mean we should 
abandon using some of the insights that have underpinned such arguments, in a 
way that reading Løgstrup can bring out. 
 I will begin by outlining the reading of Levinas that I want to focus on. I 
will then set out what I think is wrong with it as an answer to the sceptic. I will 
then turn to Løgstrup, to see if we can do better by adopting his approach. 
 But before I start, perhaps a very brief introduction to Løgstrup might be 
in order Ȃ for while I assume Levinas will be a familiar figure, Løgstrup is likely 
to be more obscure. As I have mentioned, Løgstrup was a Danish philosopher 
and theologian, born in 1905 and dying in 1981. His early reading was influenced 
by Kant and the phenomenological movement (particularly Edmund Husserl, 
Max Scheler, Hans Lipps, Martin Heidegger) and Kierkegaard, as well as Lutheran 
theology. He spent most of his academic life at the University of Aarhus, and of 
course lived through the German occupation of Denmark during the Second 
World War, which had an impact on his ethical thinking in a number of ways. He 
published his first major work The Ethical Demand in 1956 (the English 
translation published by Notre Dame University Press appeared in 1997). He 
published several later books and articles in ethics, theology,  and metaphysics 
and philosophy of art (where some of the later ethical writings are translated in 
Beyond the Ethical Demand, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007, and a two 
volume selection from the four volume work on metaphysics was published in 
translation by Marquette University Press in 1995; several more works are 
available in German, mainly translated by his wife, whom he met while studying 
in Germany before the war).2 
                                                        
2 	Þǯ
works below. 
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 One other preliminary point to mention, but which will be more     ǡ      ǯ ǡ 
and work, and that of Løgstrup. For while it seems no significant encounter 
between the two ever occurred and certainly neither responded to the other in 
writing,3 they were almost contemporary (Levinas was born in 1906 and died in 
1995), and shared many similar influences, where the connection with 
Heidegger will be important for this paper: both studied with Heidegger before ǡǯǡ
about Heidegger afterwards. Likewise for both, the central idea of their ethics is 
superficially similar Ȃ that is, while Levinas talks about the face-to-face 
encounter with the destitute other, Løgstrup emphasizes the ethical demand 
made by the other in their vulnerability and need for assistance. And both see 
the relation between ethics and religion in complex terms, on the one hand 
claiming to offer a non-theological ethics, while on the other still making use of 
religious idioms and thinking Ȃ  ǯ     
Judaism, of course, while for Løgstrup it was Lutheranism. There are thus many 
issues on which comparison and contrast between these two thinkers can be 
highly illuminating, I think Ȃ but where this paper just focuses on one, namely 
how claims about our prior embeddedness as subjects within a world of other 
individuals and their needs might play a crucial role in our reflections on the 
ethical and its justification. 
 
                                                        
3 Levinas was in Strasbourg in 1923-29, then Freiburg in 1928-29, then back in 
Strasbourg before going to Paris in 1930 until 1940, while Løgstrup was in 
Strasbourg in 1930-31, then Göttingen in 1931-32, then Freiburg in 1933-34, 
and then Tübingen in 1934-35. It is thus at least possible that they both attended ±ǯ ? ? ? ?ǡ
evidence of this. Hans Hauge has also suggested via personal communication that 
he finds it plausible that Løgstrup might have got the idea of criticizing Husserl 
(in his first attempt at writing a doctoral thesis, submitted in 1933) from 
Levinas's own thesis defense in 1930 which was oǮǯǯ. As Bjørn Rabjerg has pointed out, Husserl was almost 
completely unknown in Denmark at the time (there are only two references to 
him before Løgstrup's dealings with Husserl, in 1915 and 1922 and both by the 
psychologist Edgar Rubin), so it is very likely that Løgstrup got this idea in 
Strasbourg in 1930. ǡÞǡǮǯǡ
former. 
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1. Levinas  
In his first major work, Totality and Infinity, Levinas begins with what many take 
to be a sceptical question concerning ǣǮ            ǯǤ4 ǡ Ǯǯ
her book The Sources of Normativity: 
[I]t is the force ǥȂ the right of these concepts to give 
laws to us Ȃ that we want to understand. 
 And in ethics, the question can become urgent, for the day will 
come, for most of us, when what morality commands, obliges, or 
recommends is hard: that we share decisions with people whose    ǯ   Ǣ   
grave responsibilities to which we feel inadequate; that we sacrifice our 
lives, or voluntarily relinquish what makes them sweet. And then the 
question Ȃ why? Ȃ will press, and rightly so.5 ǯǯǣǡ
but perhaps we are being fooled, perhaps it has no right to demand anything of 
us at all? 
 However, I think it is important to be clear about the spirit in which this 
question is being asked Ȃ or rather, the type of person who is asking it. One such 
person might be the so-called egoist of legend, who thinks the only thing she has 
reason to do is what is in her interests Ȃ and so when she asks this question, she 
wants some demonstration that morality is in her interests after all. But, as H. A. 
Prichard and others have argued, to try to answer this kind of sceptic Ȃ at least 
directly Ȃ is a mistake, because such a sceptic will only be satisfied if morality is 
shown to be in her interests, which might make her then conform to morality, but 
                                                        
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 21. 
5 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 9. 
 5 
not make her moral, as she will then only do what is right because it is good for 
her to do so, and thus will never act out of moral reasons.6 
 But still, even if this direct response is hopeless and we should just not 
engage with the egoistic sceptic at all in this way, we could perhaps try another 
strategy, namely of trying to get them to see that there are reasons to do things 
which are not in their interests, of which moral reasons would then be one. Thus, 
we might not try to answer the egoist directly, but indirectly, by providing some 
argument to show they have more types of reasons than they thought. 
 But we also might not take the normative question in this egoistic spirit at 
all, and thus might not take our sceptic to be an egoist. Rather, our sceptic might 
already perfectly well accept that we can have reason to do things that are not 
grounded in our interests, but still be sceptical about morality as we have it, with ǡǮǯ     Ǯǯǡ    
that undermines its claim to our allegiance. Thus, a figure like Bernard 
Mandeville (who Korsgaard mentions), or equally figures like Nietzsche or Marx Ǯǯ, try to make us see the norms of morality in a new 
light, in a way that shakes our confidence in them Ȃ not because we are egoist, 
but precisely because we are not. For example, Nietzsche puts this kind of worry ǣ Ǯ  condemns as morality and 
not with regard to the aims and objects of life, it is a specific error with regard to 
which one should show no sympathy, an idiosyncrasy of the degenerate which has      Ǩǯ7 In speaking of harm here, I take it, 
Nietzsche is not making an egoistic appeal to the harm caused to just you as an 
individual and expecting you to reject it as a result Ȃ rather, he is appealing to the 
harm it does to us as a whole, where it is in the failure to properly connect to our 
good in general that the illegitimacy of morality as it is currently practiced 
resides. 
                                                        
6 Cf. H. A. ǡǮǫǯǡ
Moral Writings, edited by Jim MacAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
pp. 7-20. 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the IdolsǡǮ-ǯȚ ?ǡ
translated by R. J. Holingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 46. 
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 There is, finally, a third kind of moral sceptic, who does not doubt ethics 
from a purely egoistic standpoint, or claim to find in ethics some sinister facade 
for non-moral interests, but who just thinks when we engage in ethics, we 
engage in a practice that lacks the requisite grounding to really make sense Ȃ 
where the most radical claim might be that ethics just can never make sense, or ǯǤǡǡ
relativists and subjectivists might count as sceptics of this radical kind Ȃ as might 
those who think there are grounds for denying we have the sort of freedom that 
arguably morality requires.8 And a more moderate sort of sceptic might be 
Elizabeth Anscombe, when she says that while talk of moral obligation could 
have been intelligible when we believed in God as a moral legislator, now we 
have given up that belief, our talk of moral obligation is as meaningless or empty 
as talk of crimes would be in a world without law courts or the police9 Ȃ so in this ǡ    Ǯǯ     ǡ   
morality is being deployed for non-moral interests, but because we are being 
foolish in thinking we are operating within an intelligible practice when really 
we are not. 
 I do not claim that these forms of moral scepticism are exhaustive, but I 
do think they can be distinguished from one another: where we might call the 
first egoistical scepticism, the second debunking scepticism, and the third 
metaphysical scepticism, as it questions the metaphysical framework which we 
seem to need to make sense of morality. 
 Now, I am not sure Levinas is precisely clear on which scepticism he has 
in mind Ȃ and this is not a question that can be gone into properly here. Instead, I 
now want to turn to a recent reading of Levinas by Diane Perpich, which tries to 
use a transcendental approach to address these issues. 
     Ǯ ǯ ǯ   ǯre ǣǮǥǡǫǯǡǡǮ
                                                        
8 ǤǯǮǯGroundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, 4:445 (using the standard Akademie edition page 
numbering available in the margins of most translations). 
9 
ǤǤǤǡǮǯǡPhilosophy 33 (1958), pp. 1-19. 
 7 ǯǡamentally consists in. Perpich then ǯǣǮǤ
our first experience, the very one that constitutes us, and which is as if the ground ǯǤ10 Perpich takes the scepticǯǣ   ǡ ǲ     ǫǳ  ǲ    ǯ ǫǳ          ǯ
force apart from that already provided by utility or other prudential 
considerations. In effect, the skeptic doubts that there are uniquely moral 
reasons and doubts that such reasons have a normative force that cannot 
be reduced to self-interest. The skeptic thus asks what reasons there are 
to value something or someone she has been told she has an obligation to 
value. She asks why she should think that the other has moral value or 
deserves moral consideration. (EEL, pp. 130-1) 
Thus, of the three forms of moral scepticism outlined above, it is the egoistic 
sceptic that Perpich sees as ǯ  Ǥ11   ǯ
interview response a certain way, Perpich glosses his answer as follows:12 
                                                        
10 Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, 
edited by Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 184; cited in 
Diane Perpich, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), p. 130, her emphasis [hereafter abbreviated as EEL]. 
11 And also at the beginning of TI in the passage we cited, where Perpich Ǯhe skeptic in this way is evident in the 
opening lines of Totality and InfinityǯȋǡǤ ? ? ?ǡ ?ȌǤ 
12 ǮȏǯȐǯǡaims at ǮǯȋǡǤ ? ? ?ǡ ?ȌǢǤǤ
134- ?Ǥ ? ?ǤǮǯǡ
argument as such: see Michael L Morgan, Discovering Levinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 50-60. Transcendental aspects of ǯǡǮTotality and Infinityǯǡy and Charles E Scott, The 
Question of the Other: Essays in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 23- ? ?ǢǡǮǯȋȌǡFace to Face with Levinas (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1986), pp. 83-115; Jeffrey Dudiak, The Intrigue of Ethics: A Reading of the 
Idea of Discourse in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2001), and Brian Treanor, Aspects of Alterity: Levinas, Marcel 
and Contemporary Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007). 
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Faced with this ordinary sort of moral skepticism, a Levinasian response 
might begin like this: the idea of valuing something presupposes a world 
in which this something is meaningful or intelligible. If I value something Ȃ regardless of the value I assign to it Ȃ this implies I have taken its 
measure, weighed it against other objects or possibilities, and in some 
manner understood its connection to my own life and to othersǥǤ
[V]aluing requires and expresses the fact that I am already reflectively in a 
worldǥ world presupposes an other who has opened that world 
to me and with me. I do not meet the other in the world; rather, to have a 
world (which means being capable of reflection) is already to be in a 
relationship to the other. Without the other, there is no world; without 
the world, there is no ego who could be the subject or bearer of 
experiences within the world. The relation to the other is thus 
constitutive of my having a world at all. (EEL, pp. 131-3) ǡǮǯ
in the book; but I taǯ
transcendental flavor, in relation to two claims she makes here: first, that to 
value anything requires a reflective process of some kind, and second there is a 
constitutive relation between the self and the other, where therefore both claim 
that one thing is a necessary condition for the possibility of another Ȃ reflection 
is a necessary condition for valuing, and intersubjectivity is a necessary 
condition for self-hood. Suggestions of sort of are characteristic of 
transcendental arguments. 
 Moreover, so is the way she deploys these claims, and the way she tries to 
use them against the sceptic, as follows: 
[The argument] now reads in full as follows: (1) The idea of holding 
anything as a value presupposes a world in which the thing valued is 
already meaningful or intelligible. To value thus means I am already 
reflectively situated in a world. (2) Being reflectively in the world is the 
product of a social relationship, which is to say that the relation to the 
other is constitutive of my being able to value anything whatsoever. (3) 
Thus, the other person is not merely something or someone that I can 
value or fail to value. Without the other, there is no world and no 
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meaningful valuing. Hence the skǯ
to value the other and on what grounds always comes too late. It mistakes 
the other for an object within the world, rather than seeing the 
relationship to the other as the condition of my having a world at all and 
being able to find value in it. If I value anything at all, then, I am already in 
a relationship to the other. He or she already concerns me. What could my 
continuing to ask for proof of this mean except that I have failed to 
understand what sort of relationship we have? The other can never be 
only an object of value within the world concerning which I might 
rightfully ask why she or her needs should matter to me. By the time I ask 
these questions, I have already shown myself to be immersed in a 
complex evaluative practice. In effect, to ask for reasons, to ask why I 
should concern myself with the other, is itself already indicative of such Ǥǯ
passed that way, already introduced her into a world in which critical 
reflection is possible. (EEL, p. 134) 
Here, to slightly adapt ǯ -known remark concerning the Refutation of ǡ  Ǯ     has been turned against itselfǯ13 in a 
way that many take to be distinctive of transcendental arguments, where the             ǮǯǤ	ǡǡ
the sceptic, in order to be a subject at all, must already have been embedded in 
an ethical or social relation to an other, so that in questioning those relations she 
must already have shown concern towards themǡ     ǮǯǤ 
 Perpich puts this point as follows:  	   ǡ  ǯ      
light. The would-be amoralist asks for proof or evidence that the other is ǣǲ
                                                        
13 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B276. Kant of course talks about the idealist, 
rather than the sceptic. 
 10 ǫǳ14 The skeptic effectively demands a reason that    ǯ     Ǥ   ǡ 
skeptic implicates herself in the very practices of reflection that indicate 
just the sort of relation she would like to deny. That is, the skeptic uses a 
faculty or practice granted to her by the social or ethical relationship in 
order to question whether such a relation could really be attributed to 
her. Her question thus involves her in a performative contradiction and is 
in this sense self-defeating or self-refuting. (EEL, pp. 143-4) 
Perpich goes on: 
In demanding a justification, the moral skeptic is trapped in a 
performative contradiction between the content of her question and its Ǥǯ, pre-social 
subject who has no constitutive relation to the other and thus must be 
provided with reason to take the other into account. But the practices of 
reason-    ǯ    
belie her introduction into a socially or intersubjectively constituted 
world. When the s  ǲ  ǫǳ  ǲWhat is the other to ǫǳǤ	
from casting doubt on the possibility of ethical life through such 
questions, skepticism is in fact its prolongation. It is the enactment of 
ethical life. If it were not for the other who opens the world to me, I would ǯǤǡ
before I can choose is the condition for all of my later choosing, for all my 
affirming or denying. I cannot without contradiction deny my ability to 
engage in the process of critical reflection, and, by extension, I cannot 
                                                        
14 Perpich is here referring to a passage in Otherwise Than Being, where Levinas ǣǮǫǫǯǫ
presupposed that the ego is concerned only with itself, is only a concern for 
itself. In this hypothesis it indeed remains incomprehensible that the absolute 
ego posited for itself speaks a responsibility. The self is through and through a 
hostage, older than the ego, prior to principles. What is at stake for the self, in its 
being, is not to be. Beyond ǯ
(Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, translated by 
Alfonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), p. 117). Cf. EEL, p. 
135. 
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without contradiction deny my exposure to the other. This inability to 
turn a deaf ear, this non-indifference to the other, is the moment of ǯǤȋǡǤ ? ? ?-6) 
Set out as an argument, therefore, I think the structure of the performative 
contradiction Perpich has in mind is as follows: 
1.   Ǯ concern myself with ǫǯ     
reflection 
2. To engage in critical reflection is to be a subject 
3. To be a subject it is necessary to be concerned with others 
4.    Ǯ concern myself with ǫǯǡ    have 
concerned myself with them 
5.    Ǯ oncern myself with ǫǯ  
contradictory 
I now want to offer some concerns about this argument, where I will grant 
premises 1 and 2, but focus on the transcendental claim in premise 3, and worry 
about whether the final conclusion in 5 really resolves the sceptical issue from 
which Perpich starts. 
 Regarding premise 3, the question is this: Suppose the egoist accepts that 
she could not be a subject at all unless she showed concern to others Ȃ how will 
that satisfy her? One way is that it might give her an egoistic reason to be 
concerned with others: that is, she might accept that if she could not exist at all 
unless she showed concern for others, she has every reason to show such 
concern. But this is presumably hardly a satisfying result to the moralist, as it 
now just gives the egoist a non-moral reason to be moral, as Prichard and others 
have feared.  
 However, it might be said, this is to mistakenly take premise 3 on its own 
to answer the sceptic: but the point is to use premise 3 to argue for the 
performative contradiction in the conclusion, where it is this that is meant to 
answer the sceptic, by showing that she cannot properly doubt if she should 
concern herself with others, as in doing so she must presuppose such concern 
has gone on, as otherwise she would not be a subject at all who can even ask this 
question.           ǣ Ǯ  
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anything at all, then, I am already in a relationship to the other. He or she already ǯȋǡǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 I am not convinced, however, that this kind of strategy (and indeed 
performative or retorsive transcendental arguments in general, to use the other 
term that is sometimes applied to them) can really resolve the issue.15 For, it              ǯ
transcendental claim in 3 is right, all this leads to is the conclusion that to be a 
subject at all, I must have gone in for concern for others Ȃ but what the sceptic 
wants to know, is whether she was right or justified in doing so, or whether to do  ǮǯǤ The fact that she has to have been 
concerned in order to be a subject in the first place would not seem to resolve 
this worry. 
 Now, one response might be to go back to the thought that justification 
for the concern can come from the idea that without this concernǡǯ
subject at all Ȃ so I have excellent egoistic reasons for thinking I was right to be 
concerned, and far from being duped, I have done the right thing. But again, this 
is to give a grounding for concern that is merely egoistical in nature, which I take 
it is inadequate to the moralist, who is looking for a grounding which will show 
the egoist why she should not be an egoist, rather than giving her egoistic 
reasons to be moral. 
 Another response might be that in a situation where some form of activity Ȃ in this case, concern for others Ȃ is necessary, then to ask for reasons for 
engaging in it is idle: if, as a subject, I must be concerned for others because   ǯ     ǡ        
needed, as it shows I have no other option but to be concerned in this way. On its 
own, however, this seems unpersuasive, because it seems we can ask normative 
                                                        
15 For further discussion, see my ǮǫǯJens Peter Brune, 
Robert Stern and Micha Werner (eds), Transcendental Arguments in Moral 
Theory, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming. I here distinguish performative 
or retorsive transcendental arguments which try to convict the sceptic of 
undercutting their own position by denying what they must presuppose, from 
deductive transcendental argument which try to establish the falsity of the ǯ
former is a necessary condition of the latter holding true. I also argue that the 
promise of performative or retorsive transcendental arguments is illusory. 
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questions regarding features of ourselves and our lives that we see to be 
necessary, even metaphysically so Ȃ for example, death is necessary to creatures 
such as us, but we can still ask whether it is good or bad to die. 
 However, this may seem to miss the point; for it could be said that what 
makes this a performative contradiction is that it is not just necessary to us in a 
general way, but necessary to being a subject and thus even raising the question 
at all, which makes it something we must take for granted in all subsequent 
reasoning Ȃ thus, to use a familiar metaphor, on this view   Ǯ
concern myself with ǫǯ   Ǯǯ     Ǯǯ
one, and aǡǮ
the principle of non- ǫǯ In even raising the question, we are 
always already committed to this concern, because we could not ask the question 
at all if we did not. This then explains why I am obliged or bound to be concerned 
by the other: as a subject, I have no alternative option, so it is not possible to cast 
doubt on this obligation in the way the sceptic tries to do, thereby silencing her.    ǣ Ǯthout the other, there is no world and no meaningful Ǥǯ
and on what grounds always comes too lateǯȋǡǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 But here we meet a familiar worry about such arguments: namely that 
even if they show that believing or acting in a certain way is some sort of  ǡ  ǯ        
presuppositions are true or justified16 Ȃ ǯǡ
argument seems to show that such presuppositions cannot be given up or 
doubted seems to make the sceptical challenge worse not better, as now we seem 
                                                        
16 Cf. C S Peirce, Collected Papers, 8 vols, edited by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss and A. 
Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931- ? ?Ȍǡ ?ǡȚ ? ? ?ǣǮI do 
not admit that indispensability is any ground of belief. It may be indispensible 
that I should have $500 in the bankȄbecause I have given checks to that 
amount. But I have never found that the indispensability directly affected my ǡǥǡ
some ascertainable truth about it, and that the discussion is not to go on forever 
and to no purpose. A transcendentalist would claim that it is an indispensible ǲǳ
question. I used to talk like that, myself; for when I was a babe in philosophy my ƤǤant Ǥǯ   
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to be compelled to believe or act without being supplied with any grounds to 
justify these beliefs or actions. So, the sceptic might worry, all I have been shown 
is that there is no way qua subject not to be concerned by others Ȃ but I still ǯ   I have grounds for such concern that would merit it, and 
thus that I am not being duped; all I have really been shown is that I am in a 
situation where I cannot even question this, which may deepen my scepticism 
rather than alleviate it. Moreover, as an answer to the question of obligation, the 
argument seems misconceived: for while it may show that I am obligated to 
concern myself with others in the sense of being unable to do otherwise, it does 
not show that others have a legitimate authority over me and hence obligate me 
qua rational agent, which is surely what the sceptic is asking to be shown. 
 Finally, however, it     ǯ    
stronger than I have presented it so far, if instead of an argument focused on 
concern for the other, we rather focus it on the value of the other Ȃ for if we can 
show the egoist that the other has value, then this might seem to give her a 
reason to feel concern, that we have been missing so far. Thus, we might gloss ǯǣ ȋ ?Ȍ   Ǯ    ǫǯ     
reflection 
 (2) To engage in critical reflection is to be a subject ȋ ?ǯȌject it is necessary to be in an ethical and social relation 
with others  ȋ ?ǯȌs it is necessary to value them ȋ ?ǯȌ ȋ ?ǯȌ for others is justified ǡǡǯ
the normative question is answered. 
 ǡ  ǡ       ȋ ?ǯȌ  ȋ ?ǯȌǡ
which again involve the sense in which it is necessary to value others, and what 
this means. 	ǡǡǮǯis 
if it turned out we were forced into valuing things in ways that were not merited Ȃ and by demonstrating merely that one must value others, it is hard to see how 
this worry would be allayed. Of course, if one is sufficiently idealist about value, 
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one might argue that what it is to be valuable is to have value conferred on it by 
our attitudes and preferences Ȃ so if we must have a valuing attitude to X, then X 
ipso facto possesses value, and to think otherwise is to ask for more than is 
required. But then, the value of others can no longer serve as the reason for our 
social and ethical relations with others: rather, it is itself constructed through 
those relations. However, this would then leave the sceptic who wonders about 
the reason for such relations without any answer based on the value of others; 
the reason would only seem to be that such relations are necessary to be a 
subject at all, thus taking us back to the earlier form of the argument, and the 
difficulties we identified there.  
   ǡ ǡ   ǯ  ǯǡts it may possess still 
fail when taken as a transcendental argument against the moral sceptic. 
 
2. Løgstrup 
Having seen how I think the approach outlined above fails, I now want to turn to 
Løgstrup, to contrast the way he uses somewhat similar claims and insights, but 
in a different dialectic which is arguably more successful. 
 We might begin with the similarities between Levinas and Løgstrup. I 
think an important basis for this similarity is their shared background in 
Heidegger, which has been noted. When it comes to Levinas, I think Perpich is 
right to highlight the indebtedness to Heidegger in his key claim, namely that as 
subjects we are not Ǯ-ǯbeings who reside outside the social context and 
choose whether to engage with it (or not), but that we are always already 
embedded within it from the start: 
To return to our Levinasian argument then: valuing requires and 
expresses the fact that I am already reflectively in a world. To be in-the-
world can be understood here with the full richness Heidegger gives to 
the term. I am immersed in an open-ended system of relationships, many 
of which I understand and control, some of which I do not, all of which 
refer to possibilities of the kind of being that I am myself. What are we to 
say about how I came to be there? While Heidegger takes the question of 
the world-hood of the world to be one of the fundamental questions of 
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ontology, he would no doubt read the question of how we come to find 
ourselves in a world as an ontic question of little direct interest. On the 
Levinasian account, however, how we answer the question is crucial. 
Being-in-the-world, for Levinas, is neither the achievement of a self-
sufficient subject nor the ontological birthright of Dasein. Being in a world 
presupposes an other who has opened that world to me and with me. (EEL, 
p. 132) 
As others have argued,17         ǯ
thought an ethical construal Ȃ even if he resisted any such construal himself Ȃ 
and arguably this forms an important background to LeǯǤ18 
 Likewise, I think the same is true of Løgstrup. For Løgstrup also 
emphasizes the way in which we are not sovereign when it comes to our own 
lives but depend fundamentally on others through relations of trust, 
communication, and care, and equally that when we act in accordance with 
norms like trust and openness to others, we are not following norms that we 
have somehow created for ourselves as sovereign individuals Ȃ rather, seen as 
the norms which structure our lives from the outset, they might be said to have a 
certain degree of sovereignty over us, which is why Løgstrup calls them in his   Ǯ   ǯǡ          Ǯǯ       ǮǯǤ19 Thus, for example, in The 
Ethical Demand, Løgstrup writes as follows concerning trust: 
                                                        
17 See e.g. Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of 
Mitsein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
18 This is not to say that he does so with no reservations: cf. Is it Righteous to Be?, Ǥ ? ? ?ǣǮǡǡMiteinandersein, being-with-another, is 
only one moment of our presence in the world. It does not have the central place. 
Mit ǥǤǡ
zusammensein (being-together), perhaps zusammenmarschieren (marching-ȌǯǤǤǤ ? ? ?Ǥ 
19 What precisely Løgstrup means when he speaks of life being a gift in The 
Ethical Demand is somewhat controversial, but I am here following the 
suggestion of Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre that his argument relies on the Ǯgiven in the ordinary philosophical sense of being ǯȋ	ǡǮǯǡThe Ethical Demand, revised translation by Hans Fink 
and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1997), p. 
xxxv) [hereafter abbreviated as ED]. 
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It was said earlier that a person does not arbitrarily deliver himself over 
to someone else as a matter of trust. Rather, this self-surrender is a part of 
his life, irrespective of any decision on his part. Also it was said that this 
implies the demand that we take care of the life which has been placed in ǥ
we cannot alter; it is a fact of life. We do not deliberately choose to trust, 
and thereby deliver ourselves over to another. We constantly live in a 
state of being already delivered Ȃ either through a passing mood or in 
terms of something which in a fundamental way affects our entire 
destiny. (ED, pp. 54-55) 
For Løgstrup, relations of trust are not practices that people institute for 
themselves as individuals. Rather, as what Alasdair MacIntyre has called Ǯǯǡ20 we are constantly caught up in relations of trust, 
not only for information but in the very process of communication itself, which 
requires what Lø  Ǯ  ǯ Ȃ i.e. honesty in our 
engagement with one another. Of course, this does not mean that all people are 
to be trusted, that all speech is open, or that therefore we trust everyone all the 
time: but it does mean (Løgstrup thinks) that unless this were the norm, then 
human life as we know it would not be possible, making it in this sense a 
transcendental condition for such life. 
 Moreover, as we as individuals are subjects embedded in this life, rather 
than sovereign individuals who somehow create ourselves from scratch, there 
are clear echoes in Løgstrup of the key thought that Perpich attributes to 
Levinas, namely that we could not be subjects at all without this ethical and 
social context in which we exist, so we are constitutively dependent on others in 
this sense. Thus, Løgstrup writes: 
[I]t is not within our power to determine whether we wish to live in 
responsible relations or not; we find ourselves in them simply because we 
exist. We are already responsible, always, whether or not we want to be, 
because we have not ourselves ordered our own lives. We are born into a 
life that is already ordered in a very definite way, and this order lays 
                                                        
20 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need 
the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 2009). 
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claim upon us in such a manner that as we grow we find ourselves bound 
to other people and forced into responsible relationships with them. (ED, 
p. 107) 
In the following passage, therefore, Løgstrup explicitly treats the normative 
structure under which we live, including trust and care for others, as constitutive 
of our identity: 
[The sovereign expressions of life] reach back into and are given with 
something for which we are not ourselves the basis. We cannot reserve ǯǡ pleading that they are 
personal. Yet, we are on intimate terms with them. Our identity is literally 
due to them. They constitute it. Our identity is due to life-expressions 
over which we have no power except that we can annihilate them. They 
reach beyond the regional compartmentalization upon which we 
otherwise depend. (M1, p. 88, translation modified)21 
Like Levinas, though also like Levinas without mentioning Heidegger explicitly, 
there is a Heideggerian element to Løǯ    
explains their common ground. Thus, both can be read as offering a kind of 
transcendental claim about our necessary prior embeddedness as socially and 
normatively structured beings, on which our individuality depends. 
 However, while this much is shared between Levinas (as presented by 
Perpich) and Løgstrup, there is also an important difference, which is that while 
Levinas is presented as using these claims against the sceptic in a transcendental 
argument, to try to convict the sceptic of performative contradiction, Løgstrup 
seems to have no such ambition. He makes no attempt to defeat or silence the 
sceptic using an argument of this sort as such, and nor does he write as if such a 
strategy is required. Thus, despite sharing many premises and assumptions, 
there is nothing in Løgstrup to mirror the sorts of transcendental arguments we ǯǤ 
 However, it might now be puzzling why Løgstrup made a point of 
underlining our condition as socially and ethically embedded individuals, if his 
                                                        
21 K E Løgstrup, Metaphysics, volume 1, translated by Russell E Dees (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1995) [hereafter abbreviated as M1] . Cf. also ED, p.  ? ?ǣǮǡǡǯǤ 
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aim was not to construct a transcendental argument of a Levinasian sort? For, it 
could be asked, unless we are using these claims against the moral sceptic in a 
transcendental argument, what is the point of dwelling on them? What useful 
work could they be m   ǫ ǯ  only point to silence the 
sceptic, otherwise these insights are wasted? It is these assumptions that I think 
Løǯǡanother (perhaps 
ultimately more successful) way in which such transcendental insights can be 
used.22 
 To see this, it is significant first to see the dialectical situation in which 
Løgstrup thinks he is operating, given that he thinks it does not need to be met 
by a transcendental argument; what kind of challenge is it, instead? If the       ǡ ǯ    
argument to address it properly? And if it is not coming from the moral sceptic, 
how can we take Løgstrup and Levinas to be engaged in the same endeavour at 
all? To answer these questions requires some care. 
 As ǡǯ   ǯ  ǡ  she cites a 
question he was asked by an interviewereǣǮǥǡǫǯǡǯǣǮ
possible. It is a matter here of our first experience, the very one that constitutes 
usǡ          ǯǤ    ǡ     ǯ  ǡ   ǡ 
whether there are genuine reasons to care for others, to which the performative 
contradiction involved in doubting this is supposed to offer some sort of 
response. 
 ǯ
is possible. For, what is notable is that the latter raises a question about what 
someone feels, where what he asks Levinas is if he thinks anyone could be 
                                                        
22 For more on the distinction between transcendental arguments and 
transcendental claims that is developed in what follows, see Robert Stern, ǮǡǡǯǡHegel Bulletin 
34 (2013), pp. 79-97. 
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oblivious to the other, and be left indifferent to them.23 Now, this looks more like 
a phenomenological question than a question about reasons: it seems as if 
Levinas is being asked to comment on whether he thinks a person could fail to 
register the call of the other in their experience of the world, not whether a 
person could see that call as failing to give them a reason to act, which would be Ǥǡǯ
could see the call as a reason to act, but rather than no one could fail to hear the 
call in the first place, whether or not they then take it to be reason-giving. What 
seem Ǯ    ǯ    Ǯ   of our first ǯ ǡǮǯǮǯǤ
Read phenomenologically (contra Perpich), therefore, the transcendental claim 
about what constitutes us is not meant to provide us with a reason to heed the 
call of the other; it is just meant to give grounds for thinking that everyone, 
including the sceptic who claims to feel indifferent, must at some level feel this 
call, in order to be a subject at all.24 
 But even if this is perhaps a more accurate reading of this exchange 
between Levinas and his interviewer, it might still be wondered whether it 
makes much ultimate difference to what is going on: for, even if we can convince ǡǯ
she should take it seriously Ȃ why not ignore it? Surely to address this question, 
we need reasons why the call is valid or legitimate, so something more like 
Pǯ after all? 
                                                        
23 Cf. Gary Gutting, Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy since 1960 (Oxford: ǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ? ?ǡǮǯ
ethical skepticism appeals to experience rather than to argument or linguistic ǯǤ 
24 Cf. Is It Righteous to Be?ǡǤ ? ?ǡǮǫǯǣǮǡǫ	
very start you are not indifferent to the other. From the very start you are not 
alone! Even if you adopt an attitude of indifference you are obliged to adopt it! 
The other counts for you; you answer him as much as he addresses himself to ǢǨǯǡǡǤǡǤ ? ? ?ǣǮcendental conditions of the poem, ǯǤ 
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 However, the phenomenological reader might reply: This is to ǮǯǤ	ǡǡ
by the other is not just (as it were) to hear some noises, which one may or may 
not decide to take as reason-giving Ȃ as when I hear a creak on the stair at night, 
and wonder if it give me reason to call the police, or reason to go back to sleep 
but call the carpenter in the morning to get my floor-boards fixed. Rather, 
Levinas would surely hold, to feel or experience the other as requiring something 
of us precisely is to see what is going on as ǡǯ
really heard it as a call of the other at all Ȃ just as some something unconnected 
to them in any way.25 
 Nonetheless, Perpich might say, questions concerning reasons can still 
come back in. For, it could be argued, even if Levinas on this phenomenological 
reading were right to say that everyone in some sense experiences the call or 
demand of the other on them, and even if this must involve some prima facie 
sense in which they are being given a reason to act, we can still surely ask 
whether that prima facie sense is accurate, and whether we are really being 
given a reason Ȃ just as, knowing that I am addicted, I might wonder whether the 
call of the heroin to me to take it is really giving me a reason to do so. And faced 
with this question, Perpich might again suggest, convicting the sceptic of 
performative contradiction in asking it could ensure it gets a positive answer, by 
showing that we must value others in such a way as to show we have a genuine 
reason to heed the call.  
However, if my previous discussion was right, unfortunately this is not 
how things turned out: the transcendental argument did not really seem to 
                                                        
25 Cf. Korsgaard, Sources of NormativityǡǤ ? ? ?ǣǮǡ
you stop in your tracks. (If you love me, I make you come running.) Now you 
cannot proceed as you did before. Oh, you can proceed, all right, but not just as 
you did before. For now if you walk on, you will be ignoring me and slighting me. 
It will probably be difficult for you, and you will have to muster a certain active 
resistance, a sense of rebellion. But why should you have to rebel against me? It 
is because I am a law to you. By calling out your name, I have obligated you. I ǯǤǤǡǣǮmight claim to be, it is not possible ǡǡǲǫǳǡǯȋIs it Righteous to Be?, p. 184), and ibid., Ǥ ? ? ?ǣǮǡǯǤ 
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supply the right kind of reasons, so this is where we may seem to have reached 
an impasse. On the one hand, Levinas may have established that no one can fail 
to experience the  Ǣǡǯ 
argument seems to have failed to allay doubts the sceptic may have concerning 
whether or not she should heed the call, or if in doing so she would be being Ǯǯ. 
However, a way out of this impasse can be found, I think, if we consider 
an issue which we have left aside up to now, but which Løgstrup can help us see 
more clearly: namely, we have not yet considered the grounds on which the 
sceptic might question the call of the other. Assuming with the 
phenomenological argument that no one fails to experience this call because it is 
a transcendental condition on being a subject at all, but also assuming that there 
is no satisfactory transcendental argument to show that this alone puts it beyond 
questioning, nonetheless to take that scepticism seriously, we still need to be 
convinced that there are legitimate grounds the sceptic has for such questioning, 
and what they might be. 
Now, Løgstrup suggests, when we come to think we can rightfully reject 
the demand of the other, this is usually because we precisely forget the 
Heideggerian claim about embeddedness, and so easily fall into thinking of 
ourselves as sovereign in ways that we really are not, where we take this to 
warrant us in rejecting the call that others seem to make on us. This is something 
that Løgstrup warns us about repeatedly: 
[W]e live in yet another comprehensive illusion. This consists of thinking, 
feeling and acting as if we ourselves were the power to exist in our 
existence. In every way, we conduct ourselves as if we owed our existence 
to ourselves. (M1, p. 72) 
As already indicated, we live in a fundamental delusion in everything we 
think, feel and do which is just as grotesque as it is self-evident Ȃ namely 
that we owe our existence to ourselves. It is not a delusion which 
overpowers only occasionally but one in which we live and breathe, 
spiritually speaking. (M1, p. 91) 
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[I]f a person refuses to acknowledge any demand for unselfishness, he or 
she thereby also refuses to acknowledge that his or her life has been 
received as a gift. (ED, p. 116) 
Løǯǣǡ
we block its reason-      Ǯ   istence to ǯ-created, sovereign individuals, to whom the demand 
does not apply Ȃ which is how we then come to ask the questions that concern ǡ  Ǯǲ     ǫǳ  ǲ     ǯǫǳǯǤ 
 However, rather than treating these questions (as Perpich does) as 
entirely abstract questions, as based simply on denying the prima facie reason-
giving force of the other just as such, which means they can only be met by a 
transcendental argument or not at all, Løǯ    
questions are only ones to be taken seriously insofar as they have some real 
ground based on assumptions about our sovereignty; this then means that 
transcendental considerations that show how false this appeal to sovereignty is 
can be applied at this level instead Ȃ not as premises in a transcendental 
argument directed against a groundless scepticism, but as a transcendental claim 
concerning how we relate to others which can then undercut the basis on which 
the sceptic tries to block the moral demand.  
 Thus, I have suggested, it is a mistake to use the transcendental claim that 
we are necessarily constituted by others to directly block moral scepticism by 
trying to convict the sceptic of performative contradiction, as Perpich (and 
others) try to do. Rather, I have suggested, it is better to use this claim in a ǡǯ
do not apply as reasons to her, insofar as she is a sovereign individual who ǮȏȐȏȐ own life, in other words, that [she] has ǯȋǡǤ  ? ? ?ȌǤ
Levinas and Løgstrup appeal to show, therefore, is not only that we must hear 
the call of the other in so far as we are always already within a social world, but 
also that this sense of our own sovereignty that we use to block the call is a 
delusion, for such sovereignty is impossible for us. But what our reading of 
Løgstrup has likewise suggested is that certainly he, and perhaps also Levinas, 
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would not have wanted to go further, and offer a direct transcendental argument 
against moral scepticism based on such claims. 
 However, a final worry might now be raised: namely, has anything I have 
said about Løǯ  ȋ ǯ    Ȍ    Ǣ  ǯǡ ǯǯ
approach to be preferred, at least in having the right kind of ambition? For, it 
could be argued, the moral sceptic is an egoist, who thinks only her interests give 
her reasons to act; thus, even if she may hear the call of the other, she will think 
it gives her no reason to heed the call unless doing so will serve her ends. This is, 
as it were, a theory about practical reasoning. But what do Løǯ
Heideggerian observations do to block this theory or show it to be false? Even if 
Løgstrup is right to emphasizǮǡ
the authors of our goals Ȃ as though there were not a challenge that proceeds to  ǯǡ26 why ǯ  account of 
practical reasoning and so reject as illusory the reasons this world seems to 
present to us?    ǡ ǯ    ǯ
transcendental argument be required? 
 Here, I think, it is necessary to return to the distinction between kinds of 
scepticism that I outlined at the beginning. For Løgstrup, and I think also for 
Levinas, the sceptic that interests them is not (as it were) the pure moral sceptic 
with her egoistic model of practical reasoning: for very few of us are like that, 
making the model something of a philosophical construct.27 Rather, as the 
opening of Totality and Infinity suggests, we become moral sceptics not because 
we start by thinking only our interests give us reasons, but because we think the 
                                                        
26 K E Løgstrup, Norm og spontaneitet (1972), partially translated in Beyond the 
Ethical Demand, edited by Kees van Kooten Niekerk (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 95. 
27 Ǥǡǯ
comments, is that is some sense the egoist is just right, and there is a kind of ǮǯǮǯȂ but still not in a 
way that need trouble us, or that requires some transcendental argument in 
response. Cf. Is it Righteous to Be?ǡǤ ? ? ?ǣǮ
mad: I must care for your being. I cannot allow myself to abandon you to your 
death. This madnǯǡǤ ? ? ?ǣǮȏȐǡǯǡǤ ? ? ?ǡǮǯǤ 
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other kinds of reasons that are presented to us lack sufficient substance in their 
own rightǡǮǯǤǡ the claim of the 
other, we do not reject it on the grounds that while the other is perfectly entitled 
to make the claim, it is nonetheless only a reason for us to act if it coincides with 
our interests. Rather, we question the entitlement of the claim, on the grounds 
that we are not responsible for the suffering of the other, or that it can only be 
legitimate if it involves reciprocity, or that our lives are to be left at our own          Ǥ     Ǯǯ
objections to the call of the other that Løǯ   ǡ 
showing that they would only apply to sovereign individuals which we are not 
and cannot be, and thus cannot be used to block the claim others make upon us. 
If this sceptical target is less radical than the moral egoist in a way that may seem 
to devalue this response, Løgstrup would also I think take it to be more real, and 
thus it is ultimately more important to our moral lives that this is the target that 
is addressed.28  
                                                        
28 I am grateful to Diane Perpich for her helpful comments on a previous draft of 
this paper, and also to the editors of this volume. 
